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Interoceptive sensitivity is an essential component of recent models of ‘the self’. Increased 24 
focus on the self (e.g. self-observation in a mirror) can enhance aspects of self-processing. 25 
We examined whether self-observation also enhances interoceptive sensitivity. Participants 26 
performed a heartbeat detection task while looking at their own face in a mirror or at a black 27 
screen. There was significant improvement in interoceptive sensitivity in the mirror condition 28 
for those participants with lower interoceptive sensitivity at baseline. This effect was 29 
independent of the order of conditions, gender, age, body mass index, habitual exercise and 30 
changes in heart rate. Our results suggest that self-observation may represent a viable way of 31 
manipulating individuals’ interoceptive sensitivity, in order to directly test causal relations 32 
between interoceptive sensitivity and exteroceptive self-processing.  33 
34 





Recent models of the self have emphasised the fundamental role of afferent interoceptive 36 
signals, which provide information about the physiological state of the body. Interoceptive 37 
body-mapping is thought to be the foundation of the elementary feelings that we exist 38 
(Damasio, 2010) and it is further proposed that the remapping of interoceptive signals in the 39 
cortex - underpins our sense of self (Craig, 2010). However, individuals differ in the extent to 40 
which they are consciously aware of internal body states. Individual ‘interoceptive 41 
sensitivity’ is usually assessed behaviorally with a heartbeat detection task (Schandry, 1981; 42 
Whitehead & Drescher, 1980). A substantial body of research has studied the behavioral 43 
correlates of differences in interoceptive sensitivity, particularly in relation to emotional 44 
experience. For example, individuals with high interoceptive sensitivity have been shown to 45 
report more subjective emotional arousal for the same level of objective bodily arousal, 46 
despite reporting similar valence for the emotion (Dunn et al., 2010; Wiens, Mezzacappa & 47 
Katkin, 2000). Interoceptive sensitivity has also been linked to several clinical conditions, 48 
including a positive association between high interoception, anxiety and panic disorder (see 49 
Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer & Gerlach, 2010, for a review). However, low interoception 50 
may be equally significant and has been recently related to anorexia nervosa (Pollatos et al., 51 
2008), alexithymia (Herbert, Herbert & Pollatos, 2011) and moderate depression (Dunn, 52 
Dalgleish, Ogilvie & Lawrence, 2007). There is also evidence for important links with 53 
cognition, as shown by the way in which interoceptive sensitivity modulates intuitive 54 
decision-making (Dunn et al., 2010; Werner, Jung, Duschek & Schandry, 2009), probably 55 
because ‘gut feelings’ depend upon preconscious bodily signals. In a potentially similar 56 
manner, high interoceptive sensitivity is associated with both responsiveness to masked fear 57 
conditioning (Katkin, Wiens & Ohman, 2001) and implicit memory for emotionally laden 58 
words (Werner, Peres, Duschek & Schandry, 2010).  59 




Unfortunately, research on interoceptive sensitivity has been unable to establish 60 
directions of causality (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992), for example, whether high interoceptive 61 
sensitivity is the cause or the result of anxiety, or whether the two co-occur without a causal 62 
relationship, because experimental attempts at manipulation have generally been ineffective. 63 
Similarly, experimental attempts to alter people’s interoceptive sensitivity have generally 64 
been ineffective. Fairclough and Goodwin (2007) found no improvement when participants 65 
engaged in a yogic breathing pattern, although interoceptive sensitivity (for women only) was 66 
reduced by a mental stressor (possibly due to fatigue or divided attention). Khalsa, et al. 67 
(2008) likewise, found neither evidence of heightened interoceptive sensitivity in highly 68 
experienced meditators, nor any improvement after Ujjai breathing. Similarly, Stevens, et al. 69 
(2011) found no effect of anticipated social anxiety. Interoceptive sensitivity has therefore 70 
been considered a robust trait variable with good test-retest reliability (Mussgay, Klinkenberg 71 
& Ruddel, 1999). The aforementioned studies, however, compared changes in mean 72 
interoceptive sensitivity for the whole group of participants, between conditions, but did not 73 
investigate whether baseline individual differences in sensitivity (e.g. high versus low 74 
accuracy) might have influenced the extent of change for individuals under the experimental 75 
conditions. Given the substantial and growing literature on interoception, and its link with 76 
clinical symptoms, the ability to manipulate interoceptive sensitivity experimentally and to 77 
record the resulting effects on other, supposedly linked, aspects of self-processing and self-78 
experience would be highly desirable.  79 
Our experimental attempt to alter interoceptive sensitivity was prompted by studies in 80 
social psychology which have long used mirror self-observation as an attempt to increase the 81 
so-called ‘self-focus’ of individuals (Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000). For example, self-reported 82 
arousal is less influenced by experimental instructions when participants are exposed to a 83 
mirror (Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1979). Similarly, when given mirror access, participants 84 




report fewer illusory symptoms in response to a placebo (Gibbons, Carver & Scheier, 1979). 85 
An early study (Weisz, Balazs & Adam, 1988) attempted to manipulate interoceptive 86 
sensitivity, using the (apparently accidental) presence of a mirror to increase self-focus 87 
during two different heartbeat detection tasks, but did not provide conclusive evidence. 88 
Participants had to tap with their index finger immediately after each beat (heartbeat tracking) 89 
or detect discrepancies between the rhythm of their heartbeat and the rhythm of presented 90 
tones (heartbeat discrimination). The mere presence of a mirror improved performance in the 91 
discrimination, but not in the tapping task. However, that study did not control for whether 92 
participants truly looked at themselves in the mirror, nor did it investigate the potentially 93 
differential effects on individuals with high or low interoceptive sensitivity.  94 
Our study aimed to investigate interoceptive sensitivity from the perspective of ‘the 95 
self’ by studying the effect of self-observation as a means of heightening interoceptive 96 
accuracy. We used instructed and controlled self-observation and employed a well-validated 97 
heartbeat detection task (Schandry, 1981), which is sensitive to individual differences (Ehlers 98 
& Breuer, 1992; Domschke et al., 2010; Dunn et al., 2010). Self versus non-self observation 99 
was investigated by requiring participants to look into a mirror or at a non-reflective screen. 100 
Reported confounds of heartbeat detection tasks were recorded - gender, change in heart rate, 101 
age, body mass index (BMI) and level of exercise (Cameron, 2001).  102 
Methods 103 
Participants 104 
Data for 129 visitors at the Science Museum, London was analyzed (aged 10 to 74 105 
years, Table 1) after excluding 10 for not following the instructions and 14 for incomplete 106 
data. The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, Royal 107 
Holloway, University of London. Written consent was obtained for all participants, including 108 
parental consent for those under 18 years of age. 109 





All instructions were delivered, and behavioral responses recorded, using Presentation 111 
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA) on a standard desktop PC. After giving 112 
informed consent, participants’ gender, age, height, weight and their level of habitual 113 
exercise (hours/week) were recorded. Heartbeat signals were acquired with a piezo-electric 114 
pulse transducer, fitted to the participant’s left index finger and connected to a physiological 115 
data unit (26T PowerLab, AD Instruments), sampling at 1 kHz, which recorded the derived 116 
electrical signal onto a second PC running LabChart6 software (AD Instruments). 117 
Instructions for the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) were presented over noise-118 
attenuating headphones. The onset and offset of each heartbeat counting trial were cued by 119 
the words “go” and “stop”, presented audiovisually. We used a standard instruction (Ehlers & 120 
Breuer, 1992) whereby participants were asked to concentrate hard and try to silently count 121 
their own heartbeats, simply by “listening” to their bodies, without taking their pulse. In the 122 
baseline condition they were required to gaze at a black screen (30cm by 50cm) placed on an 123 
easel at eye level and at a distance of 40cm. In the mirror condition they were explicitly 124 
instructed to gaze at the reflection of their own face in a similarly sized, and positioned, 125 
mirror. Each condition consisted of three intervals (25s, 35s and 45s), presented in random 126 
order, after one training interval. No feedback was given. The order of conditions was 127 
counterbalanced. 128 
Data Reduction 129 
LabChart6 was employed to identify and count the number of R-wave peaks on the heart 130 
trace recorded for each participant in each trial, as well as to calculate the average heart rates 131 
for each trial (Jennings, et al. 1981). Every heart trace was visually inspected for artefacts and 132 
the number of R-wave peaks was recounted manually if necessary. Participants (n=14) were 133 
excluded where artefacts created uncertainty about the number of recorded beats. 134 




Interoceptive sensitivity was calculated for baseline and mirror conditions as {1/n Σ [1 - ( 135 
|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats| /recorded heartbeats )]} where n is the number of 136 
trials (Schandry, 1981). Higher scores indicate higher interoceptive sensitivity. 137 
Results  138 
We performed a median split analysis of the interoceptive sensitivity scores (median 139 
= 0.66) to directly contrast performance of the groups with low and high interoceptive 140 
sensitivity (see Table 1). We analysed using a mixed-design ANOVA, with (baseline vs. 141 
mirror) as the within-subjects factor and the order of conditions (baseline, followed by 142 
mirror, or the reverse), gender, and interoception group as between-subjects factors. The 143 
change in heart rate between conditions, age, level of habitual exercise and BMI, for each 144 
individual, were entered as covariates. Levene’s test of equality of error variances and Box’s 145 
test of equality of covariance matrices were non-significant. The main effect on interoceptive 146 
sensitivity of the two conditions (baseline vs. mirror) was not significant F(1, 107) = 0.00,  p 147 
= .96,. However, the interaction of experimental condition by interoception group was 148 
significant F(1, 107) =6.70, p = .01, 2 = 0.06 (Figure 1) indicating that self-observation 149 
significantly improved interoceptive sensitivity for the low interoception group  t(63) = -3.46, 150 
p = .001, but not for the high interoception group t(64) = 0.64, p = .52. There were no 151 
significant interactions between the experimental condition and gender F(1, 107) = 1.63,  p = 152 
.21, order of presentation of the two conditions F(1, 107) = 0.68, p = .41, change in heart rate 153 
between conditions F(1, 107) = 0.15,  p = .70,  age F(1, 107) = 0.00, p = .98, exercise F(1, 154 
107) = 0.54, p = .46, or BMI F(1, 107) = 0.16, p = .90. The main effects of gender F(1, 107) 155 
= 0.17, p = .68, and of order of conditions F(1, 107) = 3.82, p = .05, were not significant   156 
To investigate possible differences in arousal between the baseline and mirror 157 
conditions, the same ANOVA design (minus the change in HR) was used with mean heart 158 
rate as the dependent variable. Levene’s test of equality of error variances and Box’s test of 159 




equality of covariance matrices were non-significant. The main effect of condition on heart 160 
rate was non-significant F(1, 108) = 0.02, p = .90, showing that heart rates did not change 161 
significantly between the two conditions. There were no significant interactions of condition 162 
with interoception group F(1, 108) = 0.42, p = .52, gender F(1, 108) = 0.07, p = .79, order of 163 
conditions (F(1, 108) = 1.13, p = .29, exercise F(1, 108) = 0.00, p = 0.99, or BMI F(1, 108) = 164 
0.58, p = .45, or age F(1, 108) = 3.88, p = .05. The main effect of gender F(1, 108) = 1.24, p 165 
= .27, and order of conditions F(1, 108) = 2.55, p = .11 were both non-significant. We did 166 
observe, as expected, a main effect of interoception group F(1, 108) = 21.3, p < .001, 2 = 167 
0.17 . Mean heart rate was significantly lower in the high interoception group because heart 168 
rate was negatively correlated with interoceptive sensitivity r = -.28, p = .001, in the baseline, 169 
a result which has been reported previously (Cameron, 2001; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; 170 
Knapp-Kline & Kline, 2005; Stevens et al., 2011).  171 
Discussion 172 
We compared interoceptive sensitivity measured during mirror self-observation and at 173 
baseline. Individuals with above median interoceptive awareness showed no improvement 174 
while looking into a mirror but those with poorer accuracy at baseline showed a significant 175 
improvement in interoceptive sensitivity during self-observation. This effect was independent 176 
of the order in which the conditions were presented, gender, age, body mass index, the 177 
participant’s habitual level of exercise, or change in heart rate between the two conditions. 178 
Our results contrast with Weisz et al. (1988) who found a learning effect between conditions. 179 
Given that self-focus decreases available processing resources (Panayiotou & Vrana, 1998), it 180 
seems improbable that the improvement we found during self-observation can be explained 181 
by reduced task demands. The result is also unlikely to be attributable to higher arousal in the 182 
mirror condition (Van der Does, Van Dyk & Spinhoven, 1997) because heart rates did not 183 
change significantly, for either group, between the two conditions.  184 




It is possible that our analysis has uncovered an effect that was not identified in 185 
previous studies. Past research has focused on the effects of experimental treatments on the 186 
mean interoceptive sensitivity of the particular populations tested, without considering the 187 
potentially different effects of the experimental manipulation on participants with high and 188 
low interoceptive sensitivity. For example, attempts to enhance bodily self-focus, e.g. using a 189 
yogic breathing pattern (Khalsa et al., 2008; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007) or a mirror 190 
(Weisz et al., 1988), reported interoceptive sensitivity means for the whole group, but not did 191 
not examine differential effects for individuals with low or high interoceptive sensitivity at 192 
baseline. In common with Weisz et al. (1988) we found no significant effect of the mirror vs. 193 
baseline condition, in heartbeat tracking, for our participants taken as a whole. However, we 194 
demonstrate a significant effect of self-observation for those participants with low baseline 195 
interoceptive sensitivity.   196 
Our results suggest there is scope for experimental manipulations of interoceptive 197 
sensitivity. While our manipulation resulted in improved awareness only for those with low 198 
baseline interoceptive sensitivity, manipulating interoceptive awareness in general might 199 
have important clinical applications for patients whose conditions are associated with 200 
abnormal interoceptive sensitivity, as both low and high interoceptive sensitivity are 201 
associated with different clinical conditions. 202 
The present study shows how exteroception (the perception of one’s body from the 203 
outside, such as when viewing one’s face) may interact with interoception. This finding 204 
extends recent results on the interaction between interoception and exteroception, which 205 
showed that interoceptive sensitivity plays an active modulatory role in weighting and 206 
integrating exteroceptive percepts relating to the body (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez, & 207 
Costantini, 2011). Here, mirror self-observation, which relies on exteroception, enhanced low 208 
interoceptive sensitivity. Taken together, these interactions between awareness of the self 209 




from within and from the outside point to the integrative role of brain structures such as the 210 
right anterior insula, which is thought of as a convergence zone where interoceptive and 211 
exteroceptive signals are integrated, underpinning the awareness of the sentient self (Craig, 212 
2010). Activity in this area correlates with interoceptive sensitivity (Critchley, Wiens, 213 
Rotshtein, Öhman & Dolan, 2004) but is also engaged during self-face recognition (Devue & 214 
Bredart, 2011). The use of mirror self-observation while people are performing the heartbeat 215 
detection task might result in enhanced activity in the insula. Such enhancement can, in turn, 216 
facilitate self-processing. It is possible, for example, that increased activity in the insula as a 217 
result of our experimental manipulation of mirror observation could have the effect of top-218 
down gating of attention to other aspects of self-processing, resulting in the individual’s  219 
improved sensitivity to his/her own interoceptive signals, as found in our study. Top-down 220 
gating of attention could also explain why the effect was not significant in individuals with 221 
high baseline interoceptive sensitivity, who are presumably better able to attend to internal 222 
states of their bodies, even in the absence of any externally-driven focus of attention to the 223 
self.  224 
Our study has several limitations as we did not screen for medical conditions 225 
(Cameron, 2001) nor for anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010). We did not take account of 226 
participants’ possible use of time-estimation strategies (Dunn et al., 2010; Ehlers & Breuer, 227 
1992) or respiratory manoeuvers (Weisz et al., 1988). However, it is unlikely that either of 228 
the two latter potential confounds could account for a change in heartbeat detection between 229 
conditions, as they would apply equally in both. Further research is required to discover 230 
whether the effect of self-focus we discovered is specific to focusing on physical as opposed 231 
to more abstract dimensions of oneself (such as self-relevant words) and whether it depends 232 
on looking at one’s own, as opposed to another person’s face.   233 




Overall, our results provide additional evidence that the sense of bodily self results 234 
from the integration of both interoceptive and exteroceptive sensory inputs (Craig, 2010). 235 
That low interoceptive sensitivity can be enhanced by mirror self-observation, complements 236 
other recent findings that accuracy in perception of our external bodies interacts with our 237 
awareness of the body from within (Fotopoulou et al., 2012; Tsakiris et al., 2011), showing 238 
that the ‘self’ is a complex result of interoceptive and exteroceptive percepts, acting upon and 239 
reinforcing each other. 240 
241 




References  242 
Cameron, O.G. (2001). Interoception: The inside story – A model for psychosomatic 243 
processes. Psychosomatic Medicine, 63, 697-710.  244 
Craig, A.D. (2010). The sentient self. Brain Structure and Function, 214, 563–577.  245 
Critchley, H.D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., Öhman, A., & Dolan, R.J. (2004). Neural systems 246 
supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 189-195.  247 
Damasio, A.R. (2010). Self comes to mind. Constructing the conscious brain. London: 248 
Heineman.  249 
Devue, C., & Bredart, S. (2011). The neural correlates of visual self-recognition. 250 
Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 40-51.  251 
Domschke, K., Stevens, S., Pfleiderer, B., & Gerlach, A.L. (2010). Interoceptive sensitivity 252 
in anxiety and anxiety disorders: an overview and integration of neurobiological 253 
findings. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 1-11.  254 
Dunn, B.D., Dalgleish, T., Ogilvie, A.D., & Lawrence, A., (2007). Heartbeat perception in 255 
depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 1921-1930.  256 
Dunn, B.D., Galton, H.C., Morgan, R., Evans, D., Oliver, C., Meyer, M., ...Dalgleish, T. 257 
(2010). Listening to your heart: How interoception shapes emotion experience and 258 
intuitive decision making. Psychological Science, 21, 1835-1844.  259 
Ehlers, A., & Breuer, B. (1992). Increased cardiac awareness in panic disorder. Journal of 260 
Abnormal Psychology, 101, 371-382.  261 
Fairclough, S.H., & Goodwin, L. (2007). The effect of psychological stress and relaxation on 262 
interoceptive accuracy: Implications for symptom perception. Journal of 263 
Psychosomatic Research, 62, 289–295.  264 




Fejfar, M.C., & Hoyle, R.H. (2000). Effect of private self-awareness on negative affect and 265 
self-referent attribution: A quantitative review. Personality and Social Psychology 266 
Review, 4, 132-142.  267 
Fotopoulou, A., Jenkinson, P., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., Rudd, T., & Kopelman, M. (2012). 268 
Mirror-view reverses somatoparaphrenia: Dissociation between first- and third-person 269 
perspectives on body ownership. Neurophyschologia, 49, 3946-3955.  270 
Gibbons, F.X., Carver, C.S., & Scheier, M.F. (1979). Self-focused attention and the placebo 271 
effect: Fooling some of the people some of the time. Journal of Experimental Social 272 
Psychology, 15, 263-274.  273 
Herbert, B.M., Herbert, C., & Pollatos, O. (2011). On the relationship between interoceptive 274 
awareness and alexithymia: Is interoceptive awareness related to emotional 275 
awareness? Journal of Personality, 79, 1149-1175. 276 
Jennings, J.R., Berg, W.K., Hutcheson, J.S., Obrist, P., Porges, S, & Turpin, G. (1981). 277 
Publication guidelines for heart rate studies in man. Psychophysiology, 18, 226-231. 278 
Katkin, E.S., Wiens, S., & Ohman, A. (2001). Nonconscious fear conditioning, visceral 279 
perception, and the development of gut feelings. Psychological Science, 12, 366-370.  280 
Khalsa, S.S., Rudrauf, D., Damasio, A.R., Davidson, R.J., Lutz, A., & Tranel, D. (2008). 281 
Interoceptive awareness in experienced meditators. Psychophysiology, 45, 671-677.  282 
Knapp-Kline, K., & Kline, J. P. (2005). Heart rate, heart rate variability, and heartbeat 283 
detection with the method of constant stimuli: slow and steady wins the race. 284 
Biological Psychology, 69(3), 387-396.  285 
Mussgay, L., Klinkenberg, N., & Ruddel, H. (1999). Heart beat perception in patients with 286 
depressive, somatoform and personality disorders. Journal of Psychophysiology, 13, 287 
27-36.  288 




Panayiotou, G., & Vrana, S.R. (1998). Effect of self-focused attention on the startle reflex, 289 
heart rate, and memory performance among socially anxious and nonanxious 290 
individuals. Psychophysiology, 35 328–336.  291 
Pollatos, O., Kurtz, A., Albrecht, J., Schreder, T., Kleemann, A., Schopf, V., ...Schandry, R. 292 
(2008). Reduced perception of bodily signals in anorexia nervosa. Eating Behaviors, 293 
9, 381-388.  294 
Schandry, R. (1981). Heart beat perception and emotional experience. Psychophysiology, 18, 295 
483-488.  296 
Scheier, M.F., Carver, C.S., & Gibbons, F.X. (1979). Self-directed attention, awareness of 297 
bodily states and suggestibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 298 
1576-1588.  299 
Stevens, S., Gerlach, A.L., Cludius, B., Silkens, A., Craske, M.G., & Hermann, C. (2011). 300 
Heartbeat perception in social anxiety before and during speech anticipation. 301 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 138-143. 302 
Tsakiris, M., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., & Costantini, C. (2011). Just a heartbeat away from 303 
one’s body: Interoceptive sensitivity predicts malleability of body-representations. 304 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B Series, 278, 2470-2476.  305 
Van der Does, A.J.W., Van Dyk, R., & Spinhoven, P. (1997). Accurate heartbeat perception 306 
in panic disorder: fact and artefact. Journal of Affective Disorders, 43, 121-130.  307 
Weisz, J., Balazs, L., & Adam, G. (1988). The influence of self-focused attention on 308 
heartbeat perception. Psychophysiology, 25, 193-199.  309 
Werner, N.S., Jung, K., Duschek, S., & Schandry, R. (2009). Enhanced cardiac perception is 310 
associated with benefits in decision-making. Psychophysiology, 46, 1123-1129.  311 
Werner, N.S., Peres, I., Duschek, S., & Schandry, R. (2010). Implicit memory for emotional 312 
words is modulated by cardiac perception. Biological Psychology, 85, 370-376.  313 




Whitehead, W.E., & Drescher, V.M. (1980). Perception of gastric contractions and self-314 
control of gastric motility. Psychophysiology, 17, 552-558.  315 
Wiens, S., Mezzacappa, S. & Katkin, E.S. (2000). Heartbeat detection and the experience of 316 
emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 14, 417-427.  317 
  318 




Author Note:  319 
 320 
Requests for reprints should be addressed to the corresponding author: Vivien Ainley, 321 
Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK. Tel. 322 
+44(0)1784276551, Fax. +44(0)1784434347, E-mail: Vivien.Ainley.2008@live.rhul.ac.uk or 323 
manos.tsakiris@rhul.ac.uk 324 
 325 
Acknowledgments: ESRC First Grant RES-061-25-0233, and the European Research 326 
Council (ERC-2010-StG-262853) under the FP7 (to M.T.).Volkswagen Foundation 327 
‘European Platform for Life Sciences, Mind Sciences and the Humanities’ grant for the 328 
‘Body-Project’ (to A.K. and M.T.). We would like to thank the Science Museum, London, for 329 
hosting our experiment at the “Who am I?” Gallery. The Authors declare no conflict of 330 
interest. 331 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all recorded variables 332 
 333 
Variable 
All participants (n=129) 
 
 
High interoception group (n=65) 
 
 
Low interoception group (n=64) 
 
 
Mean IS1 baseline (SD) 0.64(0.19)  
[skewness=-.35, kurtosis=-.27] 
0.80(0.10) 0.49(0.13) 




Mean HR2 Baseline (SD) 75.8(10.5) 
 
72.0(9.7) 79.6(10) 
Mean HR2 Mirror (SD) 75.6(10.8) 
 
71.9(10.2) 79.4(10.1) 
% who performed the 













Mean age yrs (SD) 28.7(13.5) 
 
29.6(13.5) 27.8(13.6) 
Mean BMI3 (SD)  23.1(4.3) (for n=119) 
 
23.6(4.0) (for n=59) 22.5(4.5) (for n=60) 
Mean level of exercise 
hrs/week (SD) 
3.4(4.3) 3.7(3.8) 3.1(4.8) 
1 Interoceptive Sensitivity (Standard Deviation) 334 
2 Heart Rate  335 
3Body Mass Index 336 




Figure 1 Caption: Mean Interoceptive Sensitivity across conditions for the high and low 337 
interoceptive sensitivity groups. Error bars represent S.E.M. 338 
